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Hegel's Irrationality or the French Face of Hegel
It is well known that Alexandre Kojève played a major role in introducing Hegel's philosophy to French universities. A large number of French intellectuals and thinkers attended his lectures, including Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Georges Bataille, between 1933 and 1939 at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. However, what these thinkers were receiving was not the faithful version of Hegel's German philosophy but rather the distorted or Kojèvian interpretation, tailored to fit the French intellectual mood. These ideas became the alternative to Hegel's philosophy even among Germans, who found it difficult to understand Hegel's philosophical system. Thus, Hegel returned to them with a French flavor and accent.
According to Vincent Descombes, the most significant distortion of Hegel's philosophy was Kojève's emphasis on the irrationality of Hegel's rational philosophy. Kojève also focused on the dramatic interpretations of history and the role of class struggles in shaping and supporting progress. This is evident in what Kojève declared during the May 1968 student protests in Paris: "Since the blood has not yet been shed, that means nothing has happened yet." His statement reflects the enthusiasm contained within Kojève's thought towards violence, conflict, and irrationality. This fits well with the atmosphere of French intellectual life, which was divided between Marxist, existentialist, structuralist, nihilist, and irrationalist revolutionary currents. Kojève’s explanation of Hegel presented them with a version of Hegel that they loved or needed. In other words, Kojève told the French what they wanted to hear about Hegel. As a result, Kojève's Hegel became more famous than Hegel himself, and studies and writings on Hegel multiplied significantly.
One of the core concepts Kojève extracted from Phenomenology of Spirit is the concept of desire and the return to the body. Kojève also linked desire to history, and the famous proclamations about the "end of history," the "end of philosophy," and other "ends" became prominent. However, the idea that this end is connected to desire, and that desire leads to the end of history, is something that Hegel’s philosophy did not reach. Hegel did speak of the end of history, and in that context, the end of philosophy as well, but he did not attribute that end to the work of desire. Instead, he spoke of the completion of Spirit and the manifestations of reason. For Hegel, history has a higher driving force than desire and conflict, and the world, too, has a metaphysical order. Hegel's metaphysics, logic, and strict, disciplined philosophical system all appealed to reason and held that reason had reached a point of completeness. In other words, reason had tested all possible options, reached a conclusion, and there was nothing left to be said.
Another aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, which can be seen as personal, was his belief that his philosophical system, which he worked so diligently to refine and structure, represented the end of philosophy. According to him, no philosophical system after his would be as complete and rigorous. This view is largely correct, as Hegel’s philosophy can be considered the last systematic philosophy. Subsequent philosophies, like Nietzsche’s non-systematic philosophy, which relies on fragments and diverse writings, represent a rejection of Hegel’s metaphysics and that of his predecessors.
Philosophers like Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and Roland Barthes all addressed the theme of "ends" (the death of God, the end of philosophy and the task of thinking, the death of man, the death of the author, the death of the reader, etc.). However, the postmodern philosopher most opposed to these "deaths" and "ends" is Gilles Deleuze, who consistently rejected, in his dialogues and writings, any notion of the end of philosophy or any other end.
It is well known that Alexandre Kojève played a major role in introducing Hegel's philosophy to French universities. A large number of French intellectuals and thinkers attended his lectures, including Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Georges Bataille, between 1933 and 1939 at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. However, what these thinkers were receiving was not the faithful version of Hegel's German philosophy but rather the distorted or Kojèvian interpretation, tailored to fit the French intellectual mood. These ideas became the alternative to Hegel's philosophy even among Germans, who found it difficult to understand Hegel's philosophical system. Thus, Hegel returned to them with a French flavor and accent.
According to Vincent Descombes, the most significant distortion of Hegel's philosophy was Kojève's emphasis on the irrationality of Hegel's rational philosophy. Kojève also focused on the dramatic interpretations of history and the role of class struggles in shaping and supporting progress. This is evident in what Kojève declared during the May 1968 student protests in Paris: "Since the blood has not yet been shed, that means nothing has happened yet." His statement reflects the enthusiasm contained within Kojève's thought towards violence, conflict, and irrationality. This fits well with the atmosphere of French intellectual life, which was divided between Marxist, existentialist, structuralist, nihilist, and irrationalist revolutionary currents. Kojève’s explanation of Hegel presented them with a version of Hegel that they loved or needed. In other words, Kojève told the French what they wanted to hear about Hegel. As a result, Kojève's Hegel became more famous than Hegel himself, and studies and writings on Hegel multiplied significantly.
One of the core concepts Kojève extracted from Phenomenology of Spirit is the concept of desire and the return to the body. Kojève also linked desire to history, and the famous proclamations about the "end of history," the "end of philosophy," and other "ends" became prominent. However, the idea that this end is connected to desire, and that desire leads to the end of history, is something that Hegel’s philosophy did not reach. Hegel did speak of the end of history, and in that context, the end of philosophy as well, but he did not attribute that end to the work of desire. Instead, he spoke of the completion of Spirit and the manifestations of reason. For Hegel, history has a higher driving force than desire and conflict, and the world, too, has a metaphysical order. Hegel's metaphysics, logic, and strict, disciplined philosophical system all appealed to reason and held that reason had reached a point of completeness. In other words, reason had tested all possible options, reached a conclusion, and there was nothing left to be said.
Another aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, which can be seen as personal, was his belief that his philosophical system, which he worked so diligently to refine and structure, represented the end of philosophy. According to him, no philosophical system after his would be as complete and rigorous. This view is largely correct, as Hegel’s philosophy can be considered the last systematic philosophy. Subsequent philosophies, like Nietzsche’s non-systematic philosophy, which relies on fragments and diverse writings, represent a rejection of Hegel’s metaphysics and that of his predecessors.
Philosophers like Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and Roland Barthes all addressed the theme of "ends" (the death of God, the end of philosophy and the task of thinking, the death of man, the death of the author, the death of the reader, etc.). However, the postmodern philosopher most opposed to these "deaths" and "ends" is Gilles Deleuze, who consistently rejected, in his dialogues and writings, any notion of the end of philosophy or any other end.